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Abstract
While various forms of corruption are common in many health systems around the world, defining wrongdoing 
in terms of legality and the use of public office for private gain obstructs our understanding of its nature and 
intractability. To address this, I suggest, we must not only break the silence about the extent of wrongdoing in 
the health sector, but also talk differently about corruption in general, and corruption in healthcare specifically. 
I propose adopting the notion of institutional corruption (IC) developed by Thompson and Lessig, as divergence 
from the original purpose of the institution, which may not be illegal but may nevertheless cause harm to people 
who depend on it by creating perverse dependencies and compelling individuals to act against its core purpose. 
Such work is much needed to provide in-depth accounts of how external political and legislative pressures enable 
corruption in healthcare systems. I also argue for bringing together insights from various research domains and 
levels of analysis to capture why and how corruption becomes systemic, deeply embedded, and intractable. 
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What Is Wrong With Corruption? 
Corruption evokes strong feelings and undesirable 
associations. The word itself conjures something powerful, 
insidious, and destructive of human lives and institutions.1 In 
addition to the factors identified by the authors in their recent 
editorial,2 this perhaps explains the secrecy that surrounds it. 
Corruption is antithetical to the notion of healing,3 causing 
harm to those in need of care and diminishing trust in the 
health system,4 which thereby deviates from its core purpose 
of improving lives. Although its negative impact on society 
and individual welfare is well-established,5,6 corruption is 
a pervasive problem in the health sector.7 To address this, I 
suggest, we must not only break the silence about the extent 
of wrongdoing in the health sector, but also talk differently 
about corruption in general, and corruption in healthcare 
specifically.
Corruption commonly refers to illegal activities taking 
various forms – petty or grand, covert or open, limited or 
extensive, black, grey or white, individual or systemic.8,9 It 
may be acceptable, harmful, or simply routine.10 Transparency 
International’s widely adopted definition11 is “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain.” However, this definition 
fails to acknowledge that corruption not only or even mainly 
happens in the public sector, nor does it concern the non-
Western other3,12; The consequences of these for the public are 
probably far greater than in instances of individual corruption 
and wrongdoing, even if such actions are not unlawful, since 
they may lead, for example, to the public funding less cost-
effective care.
Arguably, corruption is not antithetical to advanced 
capitalism, involving prestigious institutions and stalwart 
private enterprises in many developed countries. Thus, 
although developed democracies may have reduced the 
incidence of conventional corruption, they are prone to their 
own kind of corruption, which may be more insidious.13 
These insidious forms of corruption are usually socially 
sanctioned and perfectly legal. The theory of institutional 
corruption (IC)14 stresses the impact of policy incentives and 
regulation on organizational culture, and how they may cause 
organizations to diverge from their original purpose. It can 
be usefully applied to better understand how organizations 
tasked with protecting the public interest in the health sector 
may lose credibility if they depart from their original mission 
by engaging in activities that endanger it, even if these 
activities are not illegal.
For instance, in the United States, members of the Food 
and Drug Administration’s advisory committees on drug 
approval are known to have financial ties with pharmaceutical 
companies.15 According to an analysis of committee records 
from 2000, in 55% of meetings, half or more of the advisors 
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had conflicts of interest.16 Although their actions may not 
be considered corrupt in the conventional sense, these 
connections have been shown to influence government 
decision-making.15,17 There is evidence that corruption can be 
found within any enabling system, including the behavior of 
political and administrative actors as purchasers, and various 
public, private, and non-profit organizations as providers of 
public services.18 
This suggests that conceiving corruption only in the 
context of illegal activities and obtaining private gain is too 
narrow. It does not include policy and legislative influences 
that undermine organizations and institutions tasked 
with protecting the public interest, leading to systematic 
divergence from their role as they engage in activities that 
are not illegal yet jeopardize their stated tasks. Deviation 
from organizational purpose with or without involving direct 
personal gain, may pervert the moral fabric of institutions 
and organizations, raising questions about their raison d’être; 
and such environments may create yet more fertile conditions 
for organizational wrongdoing by unscrupulous individuals. 
For these reasons, I call for the notion of corruption in the 
health sector to be extended beyond “illegal” and unethical 
forms of wrongdoing, to reconsider how forces both within 
and outside health institutions create situations that allow or 
encourage organizations and individuals to deviate from their 
core purpose.
Why Institutional Corruption Matters?
Many disciplines have attempted to explain corruption. One 
broad strand is concerned with structural regulatory failure, 
poorly designed incentives, and the politics of corruption.4,19 
The broader literature on wrongdoing in organizations 
focuses largely on the question of why individuals engage in 
wrongdoing.20,21 While providing important insights, these 
theories leave gaps in understanding of the organizational 
conditions that encourage corrupt practices to flourish. There 
remains the question of how collective wrongdoing spreads 
across individuals, such that they come to work together to do 
wrong in the name of the organization.22
The theory of IC provides an answer to this,13,14,23 focusing 
on forms of corruption that are not strictly illegal yet pervert 
an institution’s function under conditions that may promote 
personal benefit. It was originally developed to theorize the 
nature of corruption in the US Congress, explaining why 
organizational members are often trapped in finance-related 
institutional dependencies, for example relying on money 
from major donors or special interest groups for election and/
or retaining office.23 Unlike bribery, campaign fundraising 
serves a legitimate function and is perfectly legal, since 
political institutions rely on campaign donations for their 
functioning. Yet the influence of money damages democracy 
by circumventing and/or bypassing the legislative process 
and breaking the link between representation and power. 
According to legal scholar, Lawrence Lessig, who extended 
its application to a wider range of institutions, this form of 
corruption:
“…is a systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or 
even currently ethical, that undermines the institution’s 
effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its 
ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant 
to its purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that 
institution or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.”23
Institutional members have considerable discretion over 
the extent of their involvement in IC, ranging from extracting 
maximum benefit from the existing system, to minimal 
compliance, or speaking out and engaging in various other 
activities to counteract it.24 Organizational leaders may 
purposely manipulate administrative structures to control 
corruption.25 Individuals may also become involved in corrupt 
behaviors on behalf of the institution,26 as they engage in self-
deception to serve their own best interests.
The theory of IC, emphasizing the potential impact of an 
“economy of influence” that undermines institutions’ ability 
to perform their core tasks, has been extended to explain 
wrongdoing in many other public- and private-sector 
fields, including health services and the pharmaceutical 
industry.15,16 It offers unique insights into the causes and 
dynamics of corruption in health systems by enriching 
existing research. It elucidates how organizations themselves 
interact with regulatory regimes, public policies, and wider 
societal discourses through their leaders and members 
in ways that contribute to institutions’ divergence from 
their legitimate purpose. Such practices are a source of 
organizational corruption, because they provide benefits that 
even an uncorrupted institution needs, thus creating perverse 
dependencies and compelling individuals to act against the 
organizational purpose.23 In addition to undermining their 
purpose, such forms of corruption often harm the very 
people who rely on them. This is important, because the 
failure of designated institutions to protect the public interest 
undermines the principles of good governance19 and perverts 
the rule of law.27 Its corrosive effects on public trust and the 
ethical conduct of individuals in organizations may lead to 
the breakdown of the entire system if a perception of endemic 
corruption prevails.28 Overall, this form of corruption benefits 
the institution, while undermining it by putting its long-term 
survival at risk.29
To counteract such undesirable developments and redress 
the damage caused by loss of public confidence in in health 
organizations and health systems,30 the dynamics and 
mechanisms that cause them to become corrupt must be 
fully understood. Given the complexity and the multifaceted 
and multidimensional nature of corruption, we must 
develop transdisciplinary frameworks to address this. For 
instance, drawing on political economy and legal studies is 
important for understanding macro influences from policy 
and legislation; while institutional theory and organization 
studies can explain their implementation; and behavioural 
ethics and anthropology shed light on individual motivations 
in different cultures and sectors. Unless insights from various 
research domains and levels of analysis are brought together, 
we may not capture why and how corruption becomes 
systemic, deeply embedded, and intractable.28
Adopting a definition of IC as deviation from organizational 
purpose with or without involving direct personal gain23,24 
to theorize wrongdoing in public health institutions would 
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allow us to capture the processes, factors, and institutional 
conditions that may foster corruption, irrespective of 
their legality or ethicality. This may also help us identifing 
organizational structures, modes of operation, and initiatives 
that promote ethical behavior and remedy corruption when it 
has taken root. Drawing on various disciplinary insights and 
findings from across sectors will help model the consecutive 
steps required to introduce specific measures. The practical 
outcome of such an approach would be to design tools and 
methodologies to prevent and/or remedy IC, which may be of 
use to policy-makers and organizations.
In conclusion, I would like reiterate the necessity to 
examine “legal” forms of corruption in public institutions 
which causes them to systematically deviate from their core 
purpose, damaging their trustworthiness. I also argue for 
closer integration of the IC frame with organizational and 
ethical perspectives on wrongdoing in health systems, to 
better understand how policy influences managerial decisions 
and individual behaviors in healthcare organizations. Such 
integration might help prevent unethical outcomes and 
damage to society by restoring public institutions to their 
primary purpose (eg, delivering high-quality care in a cost-
effective manner), rather than making them less able to 
perform their functions. Finally, this might form a basis for 
developing of a set of practice-orientated diagnostic tools and 
comprehensive interventions, aiming to prevent and address 
IC where it occurs.
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